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FOREWORD

Twenty-five years after the end of the Vietnam War, the
ghost of that war still haunts decisionmakers when it comes
to making long-term commitments to situations that
remotely resemble anything like our Indochina experience.
That is the case with Colombia, which is embroiled in an
internecine struggle with two guerrilla movements, bent on
overthrowing the government, as well as with narcotraffickers and paramilitary forces.
In this, SSI’s fourth Letort Paper since the series began
nearly 3 years ago, Ambassador David Passage details the
complicated but increasingly clear nexus between the
political and social insurgencies and the drug traffickers.
This, he maintains, has obliged a highly reluctant United
States to reexamine whether its counternarcotics strategy
can succeed if it is not accompanied by a willingness to assist
the Colombian government improve its ability to defeat
guerrillas and regain control of its national territory.
If the United States is to become even more involved in
the internal struggles in Colombia, it is a good bet the U.S.
Army will play an important role. I therefore commend to
you Ambassador Passage’s The United States and
Colombia: Untying the Gordian Knot.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA:
UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT

Introduction.
A long time ago in a mythical kingdom, far, far way, King
Gordius of Phrygia tied an intricate and complex knot and
decreed that anyone who could untie it would become
Master of all Asia. Legend has it that Alexander the Great
averted an ill omen, which could have resulted from his
inability to untie the knot, by slashing through the latter
with his sword.
Today, in Colombia, the United States is faced with just
such a conundrum. Fearful of finding itself committed to a
long-term struggle against Colombian guerrillas, U.S.
counter-narcotics policy has been to help Colombia’s
government in its efforts to halt cultivation, production, and
trafficking in illicit narcotics while steering clear of its
internal insurgencies, driven as they are by socio-political,
ideological, and economic causes.
Meanwhile, Colombian authorities have acknowledged
the danger that drug trafficking poses to their society. But
the mortal threat that Colombia faces is from two guerrilla
armies that are intent on violent revolution. What is even
more complicating is that the collusion between drug
traffickers and the insurgents is growing. For the United
States, the menace of drugs is real and urgent. But the
memories of Vietnam also linger, giving pause to those who
contemplate increasing commitments in faraway places in
circumstances that even remotely resemble those extant in
Southeast Asia in the last half of the 20th century.
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America Decepta: A Western Hemisphere “Family of
Democracies.”
When El Salvador’s and Guatemala’s civil wars ended in
negotiated settlements, U.S. policymakers breathed
audible sighs of relief. Thus ended more than 40 years of
internal conflicts which convulsed a number of Latin
American states. Successive U.S. administrations
portrayed much of this as part of the global struggle
between democracy and communism—between the free
world and the “evil empire,” in Ronald Reagan’s memorable
phrase.
Because defeating the Farabund Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in El Salvador had
been a cardinal objective of U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s,
and, because the end of the civil wars in El Salvador and
Guatemala roughly coincided with the collapse of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), American
policymakers were quick to take credit and pointed to the
collapse of the USSR as the inevitable result of a failed
economic and political system lacking widespread popular
support.
But Unrest Persists.
We may have breathed our sighs of relief too soon, for we
seem to have persuaded ourselves that just because
governments come to power through the election process,
they are therefore democratic. Elections alone do not
democracies make, a truth which we ignore at our peril.
Internal conflict is not yet over in this hemisphere because
many of the underlying causes of the turmoil of the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s remain with us.
Gross corruption still exists at virtually every level of
government and society in most Latin American countries.
The disparity between the rich (who, in Latin America, are
very rich) and the poor (who, in Latin America, are very poor)
is diminishing only slowly. And a widespread popular sense
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persists in most Latin American countries that the political
and economic elites who traditionally have held power are
incapable of distracting themselves from petty political
squabbling and personal aggrandizement to turn to the real
needs of “the people.” Indeed, the traditional ruling
politicians do not even understand what those needs are .
Despair over this chasm between popular aspirations
and on-the-ground reality has led to the rise of so-called
“democratic dictators” in some Latin American countries
(e.g., Peru’s President Alberto Fujimori, Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez, and Bolivia’s Hugo Banzer), to populist
rabble-rousers in others (such as former presidents Abdalá
Bucaram of Ecuador and Ríos Montt of Guatemala), and to
reignited populist insurgencies in a third group of nations.
In three key Latin American states—Mexico, Colombia,
and Peru—guerrilla insurgencies challenge existing
political processes and institutions and in Mexico and
Colombia deny governments control over parts of their own
national territory.
In Mexico, the small but annoyingly entrenched Ejército
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) and Ejército
Popular Revolucionario (EPR) have an inviting and popular
target in the corrupt and corpulent Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI), even though the latter is now at last
trying to democratize itself. In Peru, the faintly Maoist
Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”, or SL) and even more
autarchic Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amarú
(MRTA) have conducted widespread and effective (but
ultimately nihilistic) terrorist campaigns against Peru’s
government, society, and economic infrastructure. An
autocratic but fiercely determined technocrat, President
Alberto Fujimori has waged a relentless campaign against
both SL and MRTA to good effect, but remnants of both
organizations still exist and could revive to complicate
Peru’s political scene.
And in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC), which traces its pedigree to the
3

Castro-inspired M-19 movement of the 1960s, and the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) have plagued
Colombian governments that are seeking to end guerrilla
sabotage of the country’s economic infrastructure and the
repeated humiliation of Colombia’s armed forces and police.
The United States has an important stake in the
outcome of these conflicts. While the primordial issue for the
United States is no longer competition with a nucleartipped global arch-enemy with the capacity to “make the
rubble bounce,” stresses in our neighbors’ internal political
affairs have a direct effect on the United States including (a)
a negative impact on trade and commerce, (b) increased
movements of migrants seeking to remove themselves and
their families from the crossfire, and (c) the northward flow
of illegal narcotics to the rich and insistent American
market.
The U.S. Stake in Colombia.
Economically, Colombia ranks about 25th on the list of
our most important trading partners. That means that after
Canada, Mexico, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, and a
handful of other European and Asian countries,
Colombia—with which the United States did almost $10
billion in legal two-way trade in 1998—is in the top half of
the second tier of our most important trading partners. It is
our fourth most important customer and supplier in Latin
America (after Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela); we do half
again as much business with Colombia as we do with Chile,
which aspires to be the next member of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). More than 400 of the
“Fortune 500" companies do business in Colombia either in
their own name or through wholly-owned subsidiaries,
franchises, or licensing and marketing arrangements. More
than 25,000 American citizens live and work in Colombia
and, while some of them are dual-nationals, all have a valid
expectation that the United States will look after their
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rights and, in an extreme situation, they would have a legal
right to admission into the United States.
The migration issue has enormous potential for
disrupting U.S. relations with Colombia. In numbers,
Colombians may well comprise the second largest group of
illegal aliens in the United States, after Mexicans.
Moreover, the impact of civil unrest is not confined to
Colombia but spills across its borders creating refugees in
neighboring countries as well. The numbers of displaced
persons have ebbed and flowed over the past decade, partly
as a result of changing patterns of narcotics trafficking and
other illegal activities, partly as a result of the perception of
greater economic opportunity in the United States, and
partly as a result of the growing level of violence inside
Colombia. The greatest threat of large-scale illegal
migration, however, comes from the latter. If domestic
violence ever reaches the stage where significant numbers
of Colombians (of all classes) give up hope for an end to civil
conflict and simply try to get out of the crossfire, the United
States could experience a wave of illegal immigrants similar
to what we have seen from Mexico over the past several
decades. We have already witnessed, over the past 3 years,
increasing numbers of middle and upper class Colombians
moving assets and family members to safety outside that
country. The Colombian foreign ministry reports that more
than 565,000 Colombians left during 1996-98 and have not
returned, and more than 65,000 Colombians departed on
one-way tickets during the first 6 months of 1999. In
mid-1999, the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá reported that its visa
application workload had doubled, to 50,000 per month. 1
The third important negative result of turmoil in Latin
America—the production of and trafficking in illegal
narcotics—is sufficiently obvious not to require much
elaboration. The wrenching dislocations and distortions in
Latin America’s “producer” economies by huge inflows of
ill-gotten revenues have been amply documented. All one
has to do is look at the gleaming and ostentatiously
overbuilt cities like Cali and Medellín, see the glittering
5

high-rises, condos, and residential monuments to bad taste
and excessive financial resources, and consider the amount
of arable land that has been bought up by narcotraffickers
and thus removed from agricultural development by
legitimate farmers, to see what drugs do to source country
economies.
A Sad Comparison to the Balkans.
Colombia is far more important to U.S. national
interests, overwhelmingly so in economic terms, than
anything going on in the Balkans. The United States does
more business with Colombia each week than it does all
year with all the countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia [Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina]) that used
to make up Yugoslavia, combined! The potential for large
flows of refugees to the United States from Colombia is
much greater than from the Balkans, if only because,
whereas refugees from the Balkans have other European
alternatives, the overwhelming majority of Colombians see
only the United States as a possible safe-haven.
The United States may be dismayed and distracted by
events in the Balkans, but its interests are truly menaced by
what is happening in Colombia. Yet the United States has
invested enormous amounts of diplomacy, prestige, and
military force in the Balkans despite far greater potential
there for long-term entrapment in a quagmire, and it
remains timid and nervous about a much less risky, costly,
or hazardous effort to try to help bring peace to strife-torn
Colombia. We have managed to terrify ourselves by some
ghosts from our own past in this hemisphere (c.f., the
Agency for International Development’s [AID] ill-begotten
public safety program in the 1960s, most notoriously
depicted by Costa-Gavras’ film “State of Siege”) as well as
paralyze ourselves by our domestic political and ideological
squabbling over what our national objectives ought to be in
Colombia.
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So What Should the U.S. Objective Be?
If the United States really believes what it says, we
should want to see a cohesive and democratic Colombia led
by a freely-elected government. That government should be
able to exercise effective control over its national territory,
safeguard the human rights and civil liberties of all its
citizens, end human rights abuses by its police and its
armed forces as well as by others such as paramilitaries and
guerrillas, curb the production and trafficking of illicit
narcotics, and be supported by all its citizens as it tackles
the country’s serious political, social and economic
problems.
For Colombia’s government to do that, its military and
police forces have to be sufficiently professionally trained
and equipped to be able to enforce laws and thwart armed
challenges to government authority—be they from the
FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, narcotraffickers, or other
criminal elements.It is almost irrational to expect that a
country fighting for national survival (and Colombia is, in
fact, fighting for its life, even though it is not yet anywhere
near mortal peril) should be able to quickly or easily achieve
the truly prodigious transformation necessary to live up to
accepted norms for human rights and civil liberties. It is
also exceedingly difficult for police and military forces to
transform themselves into professional and respectable
guardians of democratic and constitutional law and order
while under hostile fire from guerrilla and paramilitary
forces which obey no human rights constraints and show no
respect for civil liberties.
Having said that, the human rights records of both the
police and military forces are clearly improving. This has
been recorded by virtually all of the groups which monitor
human rights performance in Colombia. It appears to be
invisible only to the most determined nay-sayers and/or
those who so strongly oppose Colombia’s national
government and that country’s military and police forces
that they are willing to distort the truth for the sake of
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furthering their own political agendas. So here is the
conundrum: Colombia’s overarching national priority is to
reestablish sovereignty, regain control over its national
territory, end its domestic violence and resume economic
growth for all its people—but the professed U.S. objective is
simply to end illicit drug trafficking to American consumers.
U.S. Policy: A Gordian Dilemma.
We have tied our policy toward Colombia in a knot by
determinedly confining our objectives—and therefore our
supporting assistance—to counternarcotics programs,
repeatedly reaffirming that we would not be drawn into that
country’s internal strife. But it should have been obvious to
anyone not willfully obtuse that the Colombian government
was slowly but steadily losing control over its national
territory to precisely those criminal elements—the
narcotraffickers and drug lords, the FARC and ELN
guerrillas, and the paramilitary groups opposing the
latter—who were the source of both the drug trafficking and
Colombia’s deteriorating internal stability.
In fairness to successive U.S. administrations which
found themselves trapped in this thicket, objective analysis
did not lead us here. Rather, U.S. policy was forced off the
road and into the brambles by competing, highly
carnivorous, pressure groups in the United States.
On the one hand, ideologically motivated and
determined partisans in Congress have noisily and
ferociously insisted that the only way to bring America’s
drug problem under control is to stamp out production in the
source countries. These zealots have sought to compel the
Clinton administration to implement programs and spend
money on equipment and training for what has
self-evidently been a futile effort to eliminate the production
and trafficking of drugs.
On the other hand, equally determined human rights
activists in the private voluntary organization (PVO) and
8

nongovernment organization (NGO) communities,
Congress, and elsewhere, have insisted that the U.S.
Government not train or otherwise assist Colombian
military and police forces, whom they accuse, with some
justification, of having committed widespread and serious
abuses of human rights.
To a historian, the arguments and their proponents are
remarkably similar to those arrayed against the U.S. effort
to help El Salvador defeat its internal insurgency a decade
ago. The words of José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human
Rights Watch-Americas, who has observed these processes
over the years, are perhaps revealing:
[Colombia] is so polarized as a result of this nightmarish
internal conflict, and the issue of human rights is so
politicized, that there is a tendency to overlook atrocities
committed by the forces one may sympathize with.2

So, dismayed by human rights abuses committed by
Colombian police and military forces and under
considerable pressure from human rights groups and
elements in the Congress to forego assistance to Colombia’s
military forces, the U.S. Government severely restricted its
training and assistance programs. But alarmed by the
unconstrained flow of illicit narcotics to American
consumers, it created exceptions to allow counternarcotics
and limited counterterrorism training to Colombia’s
counternarcotics police (DANTI). This was subsequently
expanded to include training and equipment for National
Police units engaged in counternarcotics and counterterrorist activities, which now have been further enlarged to
include limited training for three new battalions
hand-picked from Colombian army units supporting
counternarcotics activities.
But the Clinton administration bent over backwards to
avoid the possibility that U.S.-trained Colombian
counternarcotics units might somehow end up fighting
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Colombia’s guerrilla insurgents. The State Department’s
spokesman described U.S. policy thusly:
U.S. assistance is strictly for counternarcotics purposes. We
provide anti-drug assistance to the Colombian National Police
and to those elements of the military, and only those elements of
the military, which are directly involved in counternarcotics
operations.3

U.S. Embassy personnel in Colombia (both civilian and
military) were under strict orders to monitor the use to
which U.S. training and equipment were put in order to
ensure that there was no diversion to Colombia’s
counterinsurgency effort. Helicopters and other equipment
provided by the U.S. Government were to be used only for
counternarcotics activities. Weapons, ammunition and
other lethal equipment were only for the war against drugs.
Training was almost exclusively tied to the effort to break
up the narcotics trade, arrest and prosecute drug kingpins,
and disrupt the production and transportation of drugs
destined for the U.S. market.
At one point during 1997-98, the administration even
went through an amusing, if surreal, pas de deux which
attempted to define a region (the “box”) in southeastern
Colombia where narcotraffickers, but presumably not
insurgents, were active. It was ultimately forced to abandon
this fiction as it became increasingly clear that the FARC
and ELN were moving into areas where narcotraffickers
were active, and coca and opium poppy cultivation was
expanding into territory controlled by the FARC and ELN.
Meantime, four realities gradually arose to dominate the
debate over policy. First, the FARC and ELN were
continuing to erode government control in rural areas and
step up pressure in urban areas with occasional daring
forays into the hearts of Colombia’s cities. Second, the
human rights situation was deteriorating as police and
military lashed out against civilians suspected of aiding or
sympathizing with the guerrillas. Third, well-armed,
trained, and equipped paramilitary forces such as the
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Campesino Self-Defense Force of Córdoba and Urabá
(ACCU) and United Self-Defense [groups] of Colombia
(AUC) emerged, arrogating unto themselves responsibility
for providing local community defense where government
forces were unable to prevent guerrilla activity. And fourth,
there was an evident and growing symbiosis between
narcotraffickers and paramilitary units, the FARC and the
ELN, as the latter three accepted payoffs from the drug
lords in return for protecting airfields, crops, and processing
facilities.
As it became increasingly clear that the two-decade
American effort to stamp out drug production in the
producer countries was having no impact on supplies
reaching our market, the U.S. Government—under
pressure from those in Congress who simply refused to
believe that if the United States threw enough resources at
the problem we could not stamp it out—expanded
counternarcotics cooperation with the Colombian
government. First, we enlarged the number of Colombian
entities eligible to receive training and equipment from just
the counternarcotics police to other units within the
Colombian National Police. Then we added training for
prosecuting narcotics cases. Finally, we find ourselves
tiptoeing up to providing training and equipment to
Colombian military units exclusively devoted to
counternarcotics programs.
But the simple fact remains—back to the Gordian
Knot—that there has been no diminution at all of the
cultivation of illicit drugs in Colombia, and will not be so
long as the Colombian government does not exercise control
over its national territory. Despite significant increases in
U.S. counternarcotics assistance over the past 6 years,
acreage under coca and opium poppy cultivation has
expanded every year, as has the volume of finished cocaine
and heroin bound for the American market. The much
ballyhooed reductions in Bolivian and Peruvian coca
cultivation should—if we are honest—be seen not as a
triumph for our counternarcotics effort but, rather, as an
11

unintended gain for Colombian narcotraffickers who now
have much larger and more efficient plantations in
southern and eastern Colombia, growing newer and more
potent varieties of coca, able to cut several thousand miles
off transportation routes and to eliminate the expense of
bribing, evading, or otherwise neutralizing Ecuadorian,
Peruvian, and Bolivian law enforcement officials.
Where to Begin?
A number of studies of the Colombian military’s
professional competence have recently been made by both
Colombians and foreigners, virtually all of them identifying
serious shortcomings. Despite the fact that the Colombian
military has had more experience over a longer period of
time in dealing with guerrilla insurgents than any other
military force in this hemisphere, its track record over the
past two decades has not been impressive.
By the mid-1990s, the army was suffering repeated and
humiliating defeats at the hands of the FARC and the ELN.
One of the most devastating was in 1996 at Las Delicias, in
the southern part of the country, when a sizeable army unit
was overrun by the FARC, resulting in the capture of nearly
100 government soldiers. Their release was eventually
negotiated with assistance from humanitarian
organizations, but the FARC used the occasion to hold a
press conference and announce a political manifesto of
demands and objectives. An increasing number of defeats
for the army in 1998 included a unit overrun at Caguán/El
Billar in Caquetá department in March, with 62 soldiers
killed and 43 captured; an attack at Miraflores in Guaviare
department in August, with 40 soldiers killed and 129
captured; an attack on Iribe, south of Bogotá in August, with
34 soldiers killed; and the overrunning of Mitú, the
provincial capital of the Vaupés department, along the
eastern border with Brazil on November 1, with 70 soldiers
killed and 45 captured.
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The loss at Caguán/El Billar prompted the Colombian
army’s high command to conduct an after-action review
which discovered such appalling lapses as the fact that the
officers in charge of the outpost had not even organized basic
perimeter defenses! The report noted that the troops could
not call in air support because their radio batteries were
dead, and that a number of prostitutes frequented by the
unit’s members were FARC guerrillas on intelligencegathering missions. 4 In contrast, the army had no
intelligence on the massing of nearly 800 guerrillas in
nearby areas for the attack.
Only since the latter part of 1998, after a number of
changes in personnel at the top, has the army begun to have
some success in running guerrilla groups to ground. Both
the FARC and ELN, on the other hand, continue to launch
audacious operations in the army’s own backyard, some
within sight of Bogotá itself.
Professional critiques of the Colombian army’s
performance begin with examples of incompetence and
corruption at virtually every level of leadership, and go all
the way down to ignorance and fear among ill-trained,
inadequately-equipped, and poorly-led conscripts at the
bottom.
A Role for the United States?
Many necessary changes can only be brought about as a
result of a wholesale housecleaning of incompetents by the
Colombian army itself, as it increasingly realizes the
seriousness of its predicament. At the very top, former
president Samper removed General Harold Bedoya as
commander of the armed forces, replacing him with General
Manuel José Bonett; President Pastrana continued the
process by replacing General Bonett with General
Fernando Tapias, who removed more than a dozen other
officers and ordered other personnel changes such as the
sacking of Major General Iván Ramirez, commander of the
20th intelligence brigade—an important watershed in
13

improving the army’s intelligence collection, evaluation,
and dissemination process.
But other changes are also needed, some of which
Colombia’s friends could help with. At the very least, a
carefully designed and modest assistance program could
vastly increase the speed at which the military
professionalizes itself and cleans up its past record of
human rights abuses. A partial list of the most important
deficiencies and areas for improvement would have to
include:
• Development of strategy. The Colombian army does
not yet have a viable comprehensive strategy for dealing
with the guerrillas and paramilitaries to restore
government control over its national territory.
• Training and doctrine for small unit operations.
The Colombian army is woefully unprepared for small unit
combat operations. Just before he retired to run for
president, then-armed forces chief General Bedoya said
that, if elected, he would create three new army divisions to
help deal with the guerrillas. One hopes the Colombian
army’s new leaders realize that divisions are not what one
uses to chase small bands of guerrillas through the
mountains of central Colombia.
• Training and doctrine for joint operations. The
Colombian military is only just now beginning to develop a
doctrine for joint operations, which should include the
national police, and use army, air force, and navy assets to
reinforce each others’ skills and strengths and compensate
for weaknesses.
• Training and equipment for night combat
operations. Until very recently, night combat operations
were virtually unheard of. At sundown the army repaired to
its cuarteles and hoped the guerrillas would not attack that
night.
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• Drastic improvement in the collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of usable operational
intelligence. To describe the Colombian military’s
collection and evaluation of intelligence as “primitive”
would be charitable. Dissemination of usable, actionable
intelligence is virtually nonexistent due to rivalries and
distrust between army units and their leaders.
• Development of quick reaction capabilities.
When four American birdwatchers were kidnapped at a
guerrilla roadblock in Boyaca in 1998 (along with numerous
Colombian citizens), it took more than eight hours for an
army unit to react—despite the fact that the roadblock was
less than 10 kilometers from the nearest army base.
• Creation of an airborne strike force to react
rapidly to developing tactical situations and
opportunities. In 1985, the United States helped the
Salvadoran military create a heliborne immediate reaction
force named Relámpago (Lightning), designed to launch a
reaction within 15 minutes of receiving actionable
intelligence. One of its first operations captured Nidia Díaz,
a senior FMLN comandante, when she and a small group
stopped to rest after a raid. Colombia needs to create just
such a force to react immediately to intelligence about
high-value targets.
• Enhancement of the military’s aerial medical
evacuation capability. El Salvador president José
Napoleón Duarte said that the creation of such capability
gave him the equivalent of a new division because of the
positive impact on his soldiers’ morale and confidence. (In
late 1999 it was reported that the Colombian army had
three medevac helos.)
• Dramatic improvement in logistics supply and
repair capabilities. All three military services need
significant improvements in the way they maintain their
logistics and repair facilities. These are not unknown skills
in Colombia. Avianca, the national airline, oldest in the
15

Americas and second oldest in the world, has first-class
maintenance and logistics services without which one could
never run a major international airline.
• Dramatic improvement in spare parts
inventorying and anticipation of need. For example,
until very recently, the Colombian military had no spare
helicopter rotor blades, and when the need for them arose,
helicopters were sidelined or cannibalized until
replacement blades could be ordered and shipped from the
manufacturer—a process which usually took several weeks,
and sometimes months.
• Significant improvement in transport capability
and lift. Trucks and other vehicles on the ground, and
rotary and fixed wing aircraft in the air.
The Vietnam Analogy and Lessons Learned
in El Salvador.
Those who criticize proposals for U.S. military
assistance to Colombia make three basic charges. First, the
United States would risk starting down a slippery slope that
could ultimately lead to our being trapped in a Vietnamtype civil war with similarly disastrous consequences.
Second, the Colombian military’s human rights performance is so bad that the United States should not have
anything to do with it until it cleans up its act. And third, the
magnitude of the problem in Colombia is so great as to make
any viable U.S. training and equipment program
unacceptably costly.
One of the saddest results of America’s involvement in
Vietnam is how resistant we are to learning from it, how
traumatized we remain by it, and how paralyzed our
national decisionmaking process is by the specter, however
implausible, that the United States might get involved in
another such experience.
The anonymous and obviously hostile Congressional
staffer who described U.S. military and police training
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programs in Colombia as “a perfect model of [U.S. activities]
in Vietnam in 1964” 5 obviously knows nothing about either
Vietnam or Colombia. There are a number of valid lessons to
be learned from our national experience in Vietnam, but
avoiding attempting to influence in a positive manner
developments in foreign countries of importance to the
United States should not be one of them.
Those of us who were involved in the U.S. effort to help El
Salvador bring its civil war to a negotiated settlement
without that country having to endure what Nicaragua
went through under the Sandinistas applied lessons we
learned in Vietnam. For the sake of brevity, let me condense
these to three:
• The United States made clear that it was El Salvador’s
war, not ours, to be won or lost by Salvadorans, not
Americans.
• The United States would help retrain El Salvador’s
armed forces which, at the time we became involved, had an
appalling human rights record, but we would not
participate in combat operations and would limit our
involvement to 55 trainers (not, note, “advisers”).
• The United States used all the means at its disposal to
compel the Salvadoran government to make significant
internal reforms: to end human rights abuses by the
military, eliminate death squads, draw up a new
constitution, hold free and fair elections, end the oligarchy’s
monopolies over the major cash crops (e.g., sugar, coffee,
cotton, rice, and shrimp), implement land reform, get
economic assistance to the campesinos, and start the
process of building a true democracy—none of which the
United States ever forced on the Saigon regime.
And the result in El Salvador was quite different from
that in Vietnam. Even after all other factors are taken into
account or discounted, the incontrovertible fact is that with
a modestly designed and simple U.S. assistance program
using the three key lessons learned from Vietnam, El
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Salvador’s armed forces improved their military
performance to the point that the guerrillas ultimately
concluded that they needed to negotiate a peace or risk
being wiped out. The armed forces’ leadership forced a halt
to death squad activities, curbed abuses of civil and human
rights, and was able to win the active support of the civil
population. And the armed forces became the strongest
defenders of the civilian government led by President
Duarte, who 20 years earlier had been driven into exile by
the same military which now supported him.
Ditching the Myths.
In our national discussion about what, if anything, we
should do to help Colombia, we need, first and foremost, to
ditch—echar de la ventana—the notion that U.S. training
programs and military equipment sales will start us down
the road to a Latin American version of Vietnam. That is
nonsense and ignores the highly successful U.S. effort in El
Salvador only a dozen years ago and reversal of a
disgraceful human rights situation in the process—
something the United States has every right to be proud of.
With respect to cost, the United States spent nearly $6
billion to help turn the tide in El Salvador—but that was an
impoverished country that had already been through years
of debilitating civil war. If the United States wanted to see
the situation there reversed (and President Reagan made
clear that he did), we were going to have to provide most of
the resources ourselves.
But that is not the case in Colombia—a wealthy country,
rich in resources and talent. Colombia’s problem is not
paucity of resources. It is the misapplication of them and a
still considerable degree of corruption within the military
(in the procurement process, payroll, contracts, etc.).
Colombia wastes too much money on things it does not need,
and does not spend enough to buy things it does. Its air force
still wants F-16s to replace its aging Mirages and Kfirs;
what it needs is ground attack and close air support aircraft.
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Its navy dreams of destroyers, frigates, and submarines to
maintain a “blue water” capability. What it needs is coastal
patrol and riverine craft to regain control of its territorial
waters and rivers from smugglers and narcotraffickers. And
the Colombian army wants a lot of expensive high-tech
equipment it does not need to chase small bands of
guerrillas in the mountains; what it really needs is
increased mobility and communications equipment,
training in small unit operations and night combat,
improved intelligence gathering, evaluation and
dissemination, and improvement in leadership capability.
A viable U.S. assistance program to significantly help
Colombia reorganize and reorder its internal security forces
need not be very costly. Although President Pastrana and
Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramírez have visited
Washington to discuss additional resources for Plan
Colombia (the Colombian government’s ambitious 5-year,
$7 billion campaign to restore law and order and wipe out
the illegal narcotics trafficking), the defense budget can
already provide most of what that country needs. It has an
essentially adequate force structure, although it needs to
redesign it to deal with small but highly mobile guerrilla
bands instead of invading armies from outside its borders. It
also needs to take the threat it faces seriously enough to
reexamine some of its practices, like exempting high school
graduates from combat. It needs help drawing up tables of
organization and equipment tailored to counterinsurgency
warfare, not traditional maneuver warfare.
This year, U.S. assistance to Colombia may reach $289
million—the third largest military assistance program in
the world—and in his State of the Union speech on January
27, 2000, President Clinton appealed to the Congress to
support his 2-year $1.6 billion program to help strengthen
Colombia’s democracy as well as the counternarcotics effort.
But we should not be under any illusions about its likely
impact or effectiveness. Virtually all these funds will be
spent on the continuing effort to stamp out the production
and export of drugs. Of fiscal year 1999’s $289 million, $249
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million were earmarked for police counternarcotics work,
and most of the remaining $40 million will go to train and
equip hand-picked army units (two more battalions) to
support the police war on drugs.
Finally, how large would a military training program
have to be to be viable? How many U.S. personnel would be
needed to have a significant impact on professionalizing
Colombia’s armed forces? If 55 trainers were required for
the United States to turn around the situation in El
Salvador—which one very senior American policymaker
uncharitably described to me as a country barely the size of
metropolitan Bogotá—how many U.S. military personnel
would be needed in Colombia?
There is no reason why a viable military training and
assistance program could not be accomplished with a
relatively small number of uniformed personnel, perhaps
even fewer than the famous “55.” The United States had to
help the Salvadoran armed forces develop skills in virtually
every facet of their military operations—logistics, spare
parts, uniforms, messing and rations, medical care, pay and
payroll, motor vehicles, weapons and ammunition,
housing—the works. Colombia’s military, however poor its
performance until now, is nonetheless a good deal more
capable than the military force the United States went to
assist in El Salvador in the early 1980s. And in El Salvador,
we sent trainers out to battalion level headquarters, which
would not necessarily be required in Colombia. There is no a
priori reason why a military assistance program should
have to be large to be effective, or why it should be costly or
lead to a deeper American involvement in Colombia’s
internal conflict.
As for risk, bear in mind that the United States already
has several hundred military personnel in Colombia
including more than 100 at ground-based radar stations in
exposed rural areas on Colombia’s southeastern llanos
(piedmont plains). American civilian contract personnel
man the State Department’s air wing, eradicating coca and
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opium poppies. And AID has counternarcotics as well as
development personnel across the country. The U.S.
exposure to FARC and ELN retribution is already not
exactly inconsequential.
Applying the Salvadoran Lesson to Colombia.
It is probably worth reiterating the criteria used for the
U.S. training and assistance program in El Salvador,
changing what needs to be changed in order to apply it to
Colombia:
• This is Colombia’s conflict. The United States isn’t
going to fight it for Colombia. Colombian government forces
are going to have to fight it and win it—or they, not we, will
lose it. This happens to be consistent with President
Pastrana’s view, an added advantage. 6
• The United States can help Colombia’s armed forces
evaluate shortcomings and overcome them organizationally
and through training—but only if they want our help and
are willing to apply lessons learned (both from our and their
own experience) to make the improvements necessary to
turn the situation around on the battleground.
• Finally, Colombian military and police forces need to
fundamentally change the way they deal with their civilian
population. They need to end—definitively—the human
rights abuses which have marred their interaction with the
civilian populace, remove the violators from military and
civilian ranks, and prosecute in civilian courts those who
should be charged with civil crimes and abuses.
And the Peace Process?
There is, regrettably, little in the current situation to
suggest that conditions exist for a viable negotiated peace
between the Colombian government and the FARC and/or
ELN under any circumstances other than those which
would be regarded by most Colombians—and certainly by
the powerful elites whose acquiescence would be required
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for the Pastrana government to implement one—as an
unacceptable surrender of sovereignty.
In fact, what should alarm those who seek a negotiated
peace is the gap between FARC and ELN demands and the
reality of the situation. The reality is that Colombia’s
guerrilla movements have never enjoyed significant
popular support (unlike, for example, the FSLN in
Nicaragua and FMLN in El Salvador, who at least had some
minimal level of popular standing), and may be losing
whatever appeal they may once have had. According to U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman, in an Open
Forum discussion at the State Department on November l,
1999, nationally respected and reputable polling
institutions in Colombia have found popular support for the
FARC and ELN to be no more than 3-5 percent of the voting
age population. Although there have been impressive
turnouts at massive rallies calling for an end to Colombia’s
violence, low levels of public support for the guerrillas do not
suggest a very great willingness on the part of Colombia’s
people to see their government capitulate to guerrilla
demands for the surrender of significant elements of
government responsibility.
What then are the prospects for a negotiated settlement?
If one reviews every similar situation over the past 50 years,
viable negotiations become possible only when one side
gains sufficient ground to convince its opponent (or
opponents) that it is in its (or their) best interest to negotiate
a settlement.
In Vietnam, the United States and Government of
Vietnam yielded to reality. The United States struck the
best deal it could in Paris but the jig was up and we knew it.
Henry Kissinger was not under any illusion about the
eventual outcome. He did the best he could under the
circumstances with a very weak hand. In Malaysia,Sir
Robert Thompson’s forces fought well, gained a clear
advantage and were on the verge of decimating the Chinese
insurgents when the latter agreed to end the fighting. On
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the other hand, in Kenya 5 years later, the British accepted
the reality that the Mau Mau were not going to be subdued
within any reasonable period of time or at any reasonable
cost and began the process that led to that country’s
independence. In the Philippines, Ramón Magsaysay’s
Philippine Constabulary whipped the Hukbalahap; in
Cuba, Fidel Castro’s forces defeated Fulgencio Batista’s
armed forces; in Peru, President Fujimori has beaten back
both Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA (at least for the time
being); in El Salvador and Guatemala, government forces
gained sufficient strength to persuade the FMLN and
URNG to negotiate peace agreements rather than be wiped
out.
The point is that there is a necessary precondition for
viable peace negotiations: one side or the other needs to
accept that it is losing and that its best opportunity to avoid
annihilation is to strike the most favorable bargain it
can—or for stasis to be reached between antagonists so both
sides become willing to compromise for the sake of halting
the fighting.
That is not the situation in Colombia. The government
side is hurting, but it is nowhere near being defeated.
Unlike El Salvador, which was genuinely on the ropes by
1982-83, Colombia is not in danger of imminent collapse or
defeat. Neither the FARC nor ELN is capable of storming
down out of the mountains to seize Bogotá; neither is
capable of capturing any major town and holding it for very
long. It is not necessary to throw resources at Colombia’s
problems in a panicked fashion. Neither the government
nor the Colombian people are about to surrender major
elements of sovereignty just for the sake of bringing an
ephemeral peace.
On the other hand, there is no evident incentive for
either the FARC or ELN to make concessions. They
continue to slowly enlarge the territory under their control;
their losses are sustainable at current rates; and they have
the ability to reduce losses by reducing their activity, but
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there is no real reason for them to do so by any margin that
would significantly reduce the fighting. Indeed, official
FARC statements into spring 2000 suggest no change in
their intention to defeat the government and bring about a
social, political, and economic revolution. Although the ELN
may be hurting somewhat more than the FARC from Carlos
Castaño’s paramilitary forces and has hinted at a
willingness to engage in peace talks, there is nothing to
suggest that this is anything other than a tactic to try to
counter the paramilitaries and reduce whatever assistance
they may be getting from Colombian security forces.
This is not to say that the United States should not be
willing to encourage the parties to speak to each other—or
even to speak to them ourselves if there were some useful
role we might play. As a generalized proposition in
diplomacy, dissenting U.S. congressional voices to the
contrary notwithstanding, no country should ever refuse to
speak to those it disagrees with unless there is a truly
compelling reason. So long as the Colombian government is
aware of and concurs in U.S. approaches to the FARC and/or
ELN, it would be foolish for the United States to pass up
opportunities for at least informal communications with the
insurgents, and President Pastrana has confirmed that he
was both aware of and concurred in U.S. conversations with
FARC representation.
And so, the war of attrition continues with the FARC and
the ELN slowly eroding Colombian government control over
its national territory, but not anywhere near becoming
sufficiently strong to do more than increasingly embarrass
government forces and their civilian leaders. They certainly
are not likely to become strong enough to be able to dictate
conditions for a negotiated peace for at least a number of
years, and Colombia’s armed forces are slowly starting to
improve their ability to counter the guerrillas.
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Coming to Terms.
Although Colombians will have to make most of the
decisions and fight most of the battles which will determine
the fate of their country, the United States, too, needs to
decide what it would like to see happen and what it is
prepared to do to influence the outcome.
If the United States is serious about wanting to see a
reduction in the production and trafficking in illegal
narcotics, it needs to accept the fact that no reduction is
likely until Colombia’s government regains control of its
national territory and is able to deal with narcotraffickers
on the basis of law. That is an absolute sine qua non for any
positive impact on cultivation in Colombia of the
agricultural stock (coca and opium poppies) for illegal
narcotics, its transformation into usable raw material (e.g.,
coca and poppy gum), conversion into cocaine and heroin,
and packaging and shipment to consumer countries.
If the United States is serious about wanting to see a
reduction in human rights abuses, it should offer training
programs to help professionalize both Colombia’s police and
military forces so that neither of them believe they have to
abuse human rights and deny civil liberties in order to
enforce laws and maintain public order. As was the case in
El Salvador in the early 1980s, ties between government
forces (either military or police) and paramilitary death
squads, when such occurs, reflect inadequate military
training and inept leadership. The way to persuade
government forces to sever such links, in Colombia as in El
Salvador, is to offer them an alternative—improved
training and equipment—so that they do not believe they
have to resort to extra-legal means to help them defend
their country and its elected democratic government.
In fact, Colombia’s military forces have already begun to
make significant progress in cleaning up their act. In an
August 16, 1999, letter to The Washington Post, Vice
President Gustavo Bell Lemus noted that in the past 2
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years, the number of human rights complaints filed against
the armed forces dropped by more than 85 percent, from
roughly 2,000 in 1996 to 310 in 1999, and that, whereas in
1993 approximately half of all human rights violations were
attributed to the armed forces, by 1998 that number had
fallen to only 4 percent. And although those are Colombian
government figures, even the major international human
rights organizations, Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch Americas Division, and the Washington
Office on Latin America, acknowledge that progress is being
made on curbing human rights abuses by the security
forces.
For now, Congress still prohibits U.S. assistance and
training programs to Colombian police and military units
guilty of human rights violations in the past or with human
rights violators still in their ranks. A better and more
productive approach might be for the United States to insist
on training precisely these units. Certainly the response to
human rights abuses committed by American police forces
(Los Angeles, Chicago, New York City, Washington, DC)
has not been to cut off federal training programs and funds
but, rather, to increase them.
Here, El Salvador can serve as a model: in the years
before the U.S. military assistance program began to secure
changes in that country’s performance in the early 1980s, El
Salvador’s police and military forces routinely and
repeatedly perpetrated unspeakable abuses against
innocent civilians. By the mid-1980s, with a massive
American military training program underway, the number
of such violations went into a veritable free-fall. By 1986-87,
Amnesty International and other human rights groups
reported a virtual cessation of death squad activity and
other abuses that had characterized earlier phases of El
Salvador’s civil war, and divided responsibility for the ones
that remained more or less equally between the guerrillas
and the public security forces. That contrasts dramatically
with the example of Guatemala, where the United States
engaged in no such training or assistance programs and
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where the killings went on largely unabated throughout the
length of the civil war, at the cost of tens of thousands of
lives.
Which would we rather see in Colombia—the Salvadoran
example of reform in security forces comportment and an
improvement in their performance to the point that a
negotiated peace became possible—or the Guatemalan
example of fighting fire with fire which, to be sure,
ultimately led to a Carthaginian peace?
Narcotics.
Finally, although this is not a monograph on our
counternarcotics policies, there has been enough discussion
about the effectiveness of U.S. national drug control
strategy to warrant a couple of comments and observations.
First, one would be hard-pressed to think of another
subject where we, as a nation, have engaged in more
self-deception than about the effectiveness, or even efficacy,
of our “war on drugs” and the likely impact of even tougher
and more expensive, but likely equally futile,
counternarcotics programs.
Despite the expenditure of in excess of $250 billion over
the past 20 years in an effort to halt the production and
shipment of illicit narcotics to the U.S. market, it is accurate
to say that there has been no impact at all—absolutely
none—on the street-corner price or availability of cocaine or
heroin in the United States. As much of the stuff enters the
United States as is necessary to maintain dependable
supplies at stable and affordable prices. Every change in
patterns of usage thus far (i.e., cocaine to heroin, crack to
crystal methamphetamines, etc.) can be easily and
convincingly shown to be the result of changing consumer
preferences—not changes in availability or supply.
The test of the effectiveness of our effort to stamp out the
production and transshipment of illegal narcotics to the
United States is not how many hectares of the back side of
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the Andes have been burned, how many acres of coca or
opium poppies have been sprayed, how many labs have been
smashed, 55-gallon barrels of precursor chemicals poured
into the headwaters of the Orinoco and Amazon, drug
kingpins arrested, cartels broken up, small drug-carrying
aircraft forced or shot down, or “mules” arrested at U.S.
ports of entry. The only valid test of the effectiveness of our
effort is its impact on street-corner availability of drugs
within a 5-block radius of the average American middle
school. And by all accounts, drugs of choice have never been
more freely available, purer in quality, or cheaper in price
within that 5-block radius.
The result of our crack-down on coin-operated cigarette
vending machines and convenience store sales to seventh
graders is that it is now easier for the average seventh
grader to get the equivalent number of marijuana joints (or
worse) than it is for him or her to buy a pack of cigarettes.
And the result of raising the price of cigarettes in an effort to
keep kids off them has been to make some illegal drugs
almost cost-competitive with tobacco. So long as there is an
insistent market in a country like the United States for
illegal narcotics and a sufficient profit to be made, they will
probably be produced. And so long as they are illegal, their
production and distribution will be through organized
crime.
Bottom Line.
Let us conclude by returning to the theme of this
monograph—untying the Gordian knot of counternarcotics
versus counterinsurgency. If the United States is serious
about either ending human rights abuses or curbing the
production and trafficking of illegal narcotics, the first step
has to be to help a democratically-elected Colombian
government regain control over its own national territory.
If the United States is serious about wanting to see a
reduction in human rights abuses in Colombia, it should
offer training programs to both Colombia’s civilian police
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and its military forces to help them professionalize
themselves to the point that they do not feel they have to
abuse human rights and deny civil liberties in order to
enforce Colombia’s laws and maintain public order.
If the United States and human rights activists want to
see an end to the paramilitary death squads, we need to
accept that the only way these forces will be brought under
control is by adequately trained and equipped Colombian
military and police units. Who else do we expect to do this
job? Do we really believe this can be accomplished more
easily and quickly if the United States refuses to help train
Colombian government forces to respect human rights and
defend democracy against outlaw vigilante thugs?
It is a continuing tragedy that the United States remains
so paralyzed by the ghost of Dan Mitrione (the USAID
public safety official who was kidnapped and tortured by
Uruguay’s Tupamaro guerrillas in the early 1970s,
portrayed in the film “State of Siege”) that, as a matter of
legislation (section 660a of the Foreign Assistance Act), it
continues to refuse to train foreign police forces for anything
but narrow exceptions such as counternarcotics operations.
How odd that a country like the United States, which
believes so strongly in civil law enforcement conducted and
led by civilian officials, should be unwilling to train civilian
police officials, answerable to civilian authority and
enforcing civil laws, in countries trying to democratize
themselves.
And if the United States is serious about wanting to see a
halt to the production of illegal narcotics in Colombia, the
place to begin is by helping Colombia’s democratically
elected government regain control of its national
territory—whether from drug lords, bandit armies,
paramilitary forces, or armed insurgents. It will not, repeat
not, be possible to constrict the production or trafficking in
narcotics so long as Colombia’s government cannot enforce
Colombia’s laws over the whole of its national territory.
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This hemisphere is our neighborhood. We have a vital
interest in the fate and future of its inhabitants. Colombia is
one of our neighbors. Its house is on fire; it has asked for and
needs and deserves our help. The right U.S. reaction is not
to wash our hands and walk away (on grounds that we do
not want to get involved in a Spanish-speaking Vietnam or
that Colombia’s human rights record is not spotless)—but to
roll up our sleeves and get to work to help.
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